








This article considers current definitions and
conceptualisations of famine, and their limitations.
It argues that many of the present ways of defining
and theorising famine are trapped in a framework
that regards famine as a failure to which scientific
or technical solutions can be found. Such an
approach, with its use of theoretical considerations
of cause as a starting point, leads to technologised
responses that are not only incapable of responding
adequately to the politics of mass starvations but
are themselves implicated in that politics. The
article suggests an alternative way of thinking,
where the important question is not ‘What causes
famine and what is the appropriate response if
famine is to be avoided?’ but ‘How were acts of
mass starvation committed and by whom, and how
can those responsible be brought to justice?’ In this
view, mass starvation is seen as a crime against
humanity. The language of genocide (perpetrators,
victims, bystanders) replaces that of famine
(causes, victims, relief) and the issue becomes not
what response there should be to famine, but
where responsibility lies for producing it in the first
place.
2 Conceptions of famine
There have been numerous attempts to establish
what is meant by famine and to determine what its
causes might be. The search for an adequate
definition is seen by many writers to be an essential
preliminary to both theoretical analyses and
practical action. Donors cannot be motivated to act
unless they are convinced that what is taking place
is actually a famine. Analysts cannot begin to study
the causes of famine until they know what it is they
are looking at. And yet famine is elusive: it refuses
to be pinned down by definitions.
In the Malthusian or neo-Malthusian view, famine
is a question of the excess of population over the
means of subsistence. It is an instance where
population growth has outstripped food
production. Massive starvation almost inevitably
follows until the balance is restored. For others,
famine is seen as a natural disaster that occurs
when a failure of food production, through
drought for example, leads to conditions of scarcity.
The land can no longer support the population that
relies upon it.IDS Bulletin Vol 33 No 4 2002
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This view of famine as caused by a shortage of food
was challenged by Amartya Sen. He argued that a
decline in what he called ‘food availability’ was not
necessary for a famine to occur. The total food
supply per head in any area did not matter; what
was crucial was whether particular individuals or
households had access to sufficient food. In the
famous opening words of Poverty and Famines, Sen
argues: ‘Starvation is the characteristic of some
people not having enough food to eat. It is not the
characteristic of there not being not enough food to
eat’ (Sen 1981: 1). Starvation according to Sen was
not about food as a commodity, but about the
relationship of people to that commodity. This was
an important insight, as far as it went, and it
brought academic theorising of famine back into
the realm of social science, though as Amrita
Rangasami (1985) was later to argue, it was an
insight that was already incorporated in practice, in
the Famine Codes of India, for example.
Sen’s work, with its shift away from an emphasis on
quantities of food to questions of entitlements, was
an important move in three respects. First, it
stressed the need to examine each famine in its
own particularity. Sen claimed to present not a
general theory of famine but a framework in which
individual famines could be analysed. Second, it
involved a move from the examination of overall
‘populations’ in the Malthusian mode to the study
of specific ‘persons’ or households. Finally, and
most importantly, it focused attention on
relationships. In order to understand starvation it is
necessary to look at the structure of ownership
relations and other forms of entitlement relations
within any particular society.
3 Technologised responses and
their limitations
These moves within Sen’s work were potentially very
radical, and could have produced a new approach to
famine studies. However, they did not, for two
reasons. First, although Sen moved away from the
notion of famine as a failure of food production, he
retained the idea of breakdown or collapse, this time
of a person’s entitlements. Thus famines were still
seen as failures, but ‘entitlement failures’ rather than
failures of food supply. He did not consider the
possibility that famines could be a product of the
social or economic system rather than its failure.1
When something is identified as a failure, whether
of the natural or the economic system, it appears as
a technical or managerial problem. An otherwise
benign system has collapsed and needs putting
right. The appropriate response is to try to identify
what went wrong and then to intervene in some
way to correct it. Expert knowledge of the system
and how it works enables those versed in such
technologies to apply their programmes
unproblematically and provide solutions. So, for
example, once Sen’s notion of entitlements was
accepted, plans could be put in place to replace lost
entitlements. Instead of studying populations and
food per capita, the experts in famine relief examine
the individual household, its vulnerability and its
coping strategies. These responses are
depoliticised, technologised responses. Solutions
are implemented by experts, without consultation
with those involved. The victims are seen as just
that – they have no political voice.
The second reason why the radical potential of
Sen’s approach was blunted is to be found in Sen’s
very limited view of what politics is. He sees
politics as separable from economics and the state
as ultimately benign and non-violent. He excludes
two things from consideration in his entitlements
approach: instances of deliberate starvation, and
what he calls ‘non-entitlement transfers’.2 Both of
these routinely occur during famines. In addition,
Sen does not question the way in which the
legitimate violence of the state can be used to
uphold the ownership rights of certain sections of
the community while others starve, although he
does acknowledge that ‘starvation deaths can
reflect legality with a vengeance’ (Sen 1981: 166).
Sen’s approach, ‘which purports to provide a
framework for understanding starvation and
famines, excludes any adequate understanding of
precisely those conditions that obtain whenever
there is a famine – the denial of access to food by
force employed on behalf of those who possess
food’ (Edkins 2000: 59).
The distinction being made here between
technologised, managerial responses and fully
politicised responses needs to be clarified. It is not
the same as the distinction often made between
practitioners on the one hand and academics on
the other, nor is it a question of responses that
attend to the symptoms not the causes. A
13
technologised response, in the use of the term here,
is a response that claims to rely on a theoretical
framework and a set of rules, practices or
techniques derived from it. The theory is deemed
to be applicable in a series of different historical
and geographical locations. In this view, the job of
the practitioner is to become an expert in the
various theories and their application. The expert is
accepted as politically neutral.
A fully politicised response recognises that there is
no one theory that will apply everywhere, and that
in any case first, theoretical analyses already
embody political assumptions and second, the
application of general rules to particular cases is
not straightforward. Practitioners, however well
versed in theoretical studies, and however
comprehensive the procedure manual they carry,
always in the end have to make judgements. They
have to decide what is to be done in the particular
situation in which they find themselves. Their
decision will always be political; it will have
consequences for power relations. As such, it
embodies responsibility. To hide behind a claim to
expert status is to deny that responsibility.
4 Repoliticising mass starvations
One of the reasons Sen’s entitlement approach falls
into the same trap as theories of famine as natural
disaster and leads to technologised responses is
that he retained a definition of famine which, like
other definitions current in the mid-1980s, focused
on demographic and biological factors and saw
famine as a breakdown. His definition of famine
was: ‘A particularly virulent manifestation of
starvation causing widespread death’ (Sen 1981:
40).
Rangasami (1985) questions this definition on two
grounds. First, she argues that mortality is not a
necessary condition of famine but only its
biological culmination. Famine should be seen as a
protracted politico-social-economic process of
oppression comprising three stages: dearth,
famishment and mortality. The culmination of the
process comes well before the final stage of disease
and death. If the process is halted before people
die, it is nonetheless still a famine. Second, famine
cannot be defined solely with reference to the
victims. The process is one in which ‘benefits
accrue to one section of the community while
losses flow to the other’ (Rangasami 1985: 1748).
To study only the responses or coping strategies of
victims, while paying no attention to the actions
(or inaction) of the rest of the community is to miss
what is going on.
Since Rangasami’s work, other writers, including
Alex de Waal (1989), have developed the notion of
famine as a process and examined the coping
strategies that those suffering from famine employ
at different stages. Only one writer – David Keen
(1994) – has taken up directly the challenge of
examining the strategies of the beneficiaries of
famine: its perpetrators and its bystanders.3 In his
study of famine in the Sudan, Keen poses the
questions ‘what use is famine, what functions does
it assure, in what strategies is it integrated?’4 (Keen
1994: 12).
Such questions are not easy ones for the academic
community, particularly the development
community, to ask. They involve moving away
from an approach that is restricted to the level of
cause. Asking for the ‘cause’ of famine makes mass
starvation appear ‘as a sort of disease or abscess...an
obstacle to be removed, a dysfunctioning to be
rectified’ (Foucault 1980: 135). The question
should rather be posed in a positive sense. It is
necessary to ask who benefits from mass
starvations, not just who the victims are. To do this
reinstates mass starvation as a political process.
It is necessary to be clear how the term ‘political’ is
being used here. A political process is one that
involves relationships of power between people
and between groups. And it is a process that
involves decisioning and responsibility, rather than
simply rule-following (Edkins 2000: 148–9). It is
not a question of the realm of what is generally
called ‘politics’ (political parties, elections or other
struggles for state control), as distinct from
economics or the social realm. Those distinctions
are unhelpful. To treat mass starvations as political
processes is to pay attention to them as processes
that involve relationships between people (not just
between persons and commodities, as in
entitlements theory). Social relations are inevitably
power relations. However, power is not centralised
and possessed, but dispersed. Power relations are
produced on a day-to-day basis through small-
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scale actions and interactions of individual people.
The best action to take in particular circumstances
cannot be decided by experts or determined by
manuals, though both may help. In the end it is a
question of responsibility and judgement in
arriving at decisions and acting.
To study mass starvations as political processes, is
to examine how they come about, what small
actions or inaction on the part of which people
make them happen, and who exactly the
beneficiaries and the victims are. It brings in
questions of responsibility. It requires a detailed
investigation, rather than a grand general theory. It
means addressing minutiae or details. Raul Hilberg
is a historian who adopts this approach in his work
on the Nazi genocide. He says: ‘In all my work I
have never begun by asking the big questions,
because I was always afraid that I would come up
with small answers....I look at the process...as a
series of minute steps’ (Lanzmann 1995: 55).
It cannot be assumed that famine and mass
starvation is something that the whole of the
international community would fight against if
only it knew how. To do so is to forget that, as
Rangasami reminds us, many benefit in some way
from famine and oppression. And it is to forget that
even under the rule of law in democratic states,
violence is present. David Keen (1994) and Mark
Duffield (1993, 1994, 1998) have shown that there
are numerous beneficiaries of the famines and mass
starvations in the Horn of Africa, and they have
acknowledged the violence inherent in so-called
peaceful democratic states and international
structures of dominance and oppression.
5 Attributing responsibility 
If it is accepted that mass starvation is the result of
a series of small acts, at least some of them
deliberate and some carried out with the intention
of producing what are called famines, or what I
would like to call ‘mass starvations’, then it is
necessary to begin to pay attention to the question
of responsibility. Alex de Waal has used the phrase
‘famine crimes’ (de Waal 1997) and suggested that
a possible solution would be ‘anti-famine contracts’
between rulers and people. If such a political
contract is in place ‘famine is a political scandal.
Famine is deterred’ (de Waal 1997: 5).
Such political contracts may seem to be more likely
in democratic political regimes rather than
authoritarian ones (de Waal 2000). However, it is
important to avoid concluding that ‘democracy
prevents famine’. Such an inference risks reinstating
a grand theory of famine. A return to theory requires
definitions, abstractions and generalisations and
leads once more to technical solutions. Grand
theories take the politics out of the situation,
replacing it with expert knowledge that pretends to
objectivity. This is the case even when the theory
concerned is a theory of politics. They play into the
hands of those whose power is built on a culture of
expertise and scientific objectivity. It is also
important to avoid framing anti-famine contracts as
simply measures against governments that fail to
respond quickly enough to an emerging crisis: to say
this would be to return promptly to the language of
failure, breakdown and disaster. Although one may
want to allocate responsibility for an inadequate
response, this is merely a first stage. It is clearly the
case, as Devereux (2000: 27) argues, that ‘famines
occur because they are not prevented: they are
allowed to happen.’ It is also unfortunately the case
that famines occur because they are made to happen.
Once mass starvations are considered crimes and the
parallels made with other crimes, like genocide or
war crimes, two things happen. First, the vocabulary
changes. When genocide is discussed, it is not so
much a question of causes and solutions, but one of
responsibility, criminal liability, perpetrators,
bystanders, victims and survivors. Keen suggested
that the question of famine should be phrased in a
positive sense: ‘what functions does famine have?’
rather than the negative sense: ‘what causes the
failures that lead to famine?’ Using the language of
genocide, appropriate questions become: ‘Who
committed the famine?’, ‘How was it committed and
why?’, ‘Who were the victims?’, ‘Who was involved
(e.g. state, societal institutions, various people–
ethnic groups, individuals with certain job
roles/professions, bystanders, etc.)?’5 Or, substituting
‘mass starvations’ for ‘famine’: ‘Who committed the
mass starvation?’ If mass starvation is a crime, the
appropriate language should be used. Crimes don’t
happen, they are committed. Crime is not ‘ended’
but criminals deterred, detained and prosecuted.
The second consequence of mass starvation being
considered a crime is that those who commit it are
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prosecuted. This has not happened so far of course,
but there are prospects that it may in the not too
distant future, with the establishment of the
International Criminal Court. The Rome Statute of
the ICC was signed in 1998 and came into force in
July 2002. During the discussions establishing the
court there was a considerable expansion of the list
of crimes against humanity. These crimes are no
longer linked with warfare; they can take place in
peacetime. Certain proposals did not have
sufficient support to make the list: currently
terrorism, economic embargo, and mass starvation
do not appear (Schabas 2001: 38).
Despite this, the Rome Statute already explicitly
includes mass starvation under three headings. It is a
war crime if it is used as a weapon of war; a crime
against humanity, if it is the deliberate extermination
of a civilian population by the deprivation of food;
and a genocide, if it is carried out with the intention
of destroying in whole or in part a national, ethnic,
racial or religious group. ‘Intentionally using
starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by
depriving them of objects indispensable to their
survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies
as provided for under the Geneva Conventions’ is
defined as a war crime in Article 8. At present, this
applies only when starvation takes place in
international conflict: it is not yet included in the
statute in respect of armed conflict not of an
international character (Schabas 2001: 170). Article
7 of the Rome Statute defines ‘extermination’ as a
crime against humanity ‘when committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against any
civilian population’ where ‘“extermination” includes
the intentional infliction of conditions of life, inter
alia the deprivation of access to food and medicine,
calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a
population’ (Schabas 2001: 174). Genocide is
defined in Article 6 and includes ‘deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in
part’ (Schabas 2001: 169). The term ‘conditions of
life’ is further defined as including ‘deliberate
deprivation of resources indispensable for survival,
such as food or medical services, or systematic
expulsion from homes’ (Schabas 2001: 250).
There is an obvious question that must be raised
over the strategy being proposed here, which is one
of criminalisation. It could be argued that
criminalisation is nothing but another form of
depoliticisation.6 We put in place, quite literally, a
rulebook, and alongside it a set of criteria for what
counts as evidence. By naming famine as a ‘crime’,
and defining what is to count as ‘mass starvation’ in
a statute or in case law, are we not merely removing
it once more from the realm of the political? Michel
Foucault in particular saw the production of a
criminal class as a form of depoliticisation. As a
disciplinary practice, it functions to delineate a
certain group of people and to label their acts as
criminal, not political (Foucault 1991: 277). States
have used legislation in this way to outlaw certain
forms of protest and to reserve to themselves the
monopoly of legitimate violence within a society.
What is proposed here is somewhat different, of
course. First, in the case of the International
Criminal Court, like the International Tribunals in
the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, the state is
not in the same place as usual. The state is not
necessarily on the side of the prosecutor, but in the
dock with the accused. The tables have in a sense
been turned and those not generally subject to the
rule of law, those who have sovereignty, those who
can declare a state of emergency and suspend the
law, are the ones being made accountable. Second,
in the courts it is recognised that what is taking
place is a specific judgement or a decision. The
evidence of what happened, precisely and in detail,
must be investigated. The application of the law to
a particular case is accepted as problematic.
However, the important point is that the
distinction between a technical act and a political
act is not a simple opposition. The aim of the
critique offered here is not merely to argue for
politicisation in the place of technologisation, but
to point to the way in which what we call
techniques, or experts, or theories, are already
intensely political. There is a tension between
technologisation and politicisation. It is not really
possible to replace one with the other. Any
repoliticisation can be assimilated and depoliticised
once more. This is what has happened to
successive attempts to repoliticise famine theory,
from Sen’s entitlement approach onwards. A radical
repoliticisation has been followed by the
incorporation of the new approach as nothing
more than a new technology. And any
technologisation remains at root a political move.
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6 Conclusion
Any definition of famine that sees it as a failure of
some sort is missing the point. Whether famine is
seen as a failure of food supply, a breakdown in the
food distribution system, or a multi-faceted
livelihoods crisis, the outcome is the same. These
definitions or concepts blind us to the fact that
famines, and the deaths, migrations or
impoverishments that they produce, are enormously
beneficial to the perpetrators: they are a success not
a failure, a normal output of the current economic
and political system, not an aberration.
This article has suggested that it might be useful to
replace the notion of famine. It has begun to
substitute the phrase ‘mass starvations’ in an
attempt to get away from the idea of scarcity as a
cause and famines as a breakdown or failure. To
talk of mass starvations is to evoke the parallel of
mass killings and genocides. In many ways
famines, though distinct from genocides, share
more with these acts than they do with natural
disasters. In many if not most cases, they are the
result of deliberate actions by people who can see
what the consequences of those actions will be. If
they are not produced deliberately, then they are
often allowed to progress beyond the stage of
‘famishment’ to that of ‘morbidity’ through
deliberate or negligent inaction on the part of those
who could intervene to save lives and livelihoods.
There is already an embryonic provision in
international law that allows for the prosecution of
those responsible for mass starvations. Rather than
assuming goodwill and unanimity in the project of
‘Ending Famine in the 21st Century’, it might be as
well to consider campaigning to improve these
provisions and to remove impunity from those
who, nationally or internationally, commit famine
crimes or the crime of mass starvation. This would
take place alongside action to establish robust anti-
starvation political contracts locally.
There is a need for a new language that talks of
mass starvations, which, like mass killings, are
regarded as a crime against humanity. Famines are
not caused by abstractions – climate, food supply,
entitlement failure, war – they are brought about
through the acts or omissions of people or groups
of people. These people are responsible for famine




1. ‘Complex political emergency’ approaches retain this
idea that famines are unexpected ‘emergencies’
rather than a product of ‘normal’ social and political
life.
2. Both where a person starves deliberately and where
a person is deliberately starved. Non-entitlement
transfers are those that fall outside the legal system of
the society concerned.
3. Mark Duffield examines this question on a broader
canvas as part of a system of global governance
(Duffield 2001).
4. In framing these questions, Keen is drawing on
Michel Foucault’s remarks on the Soviet Gulag
(Foucault 1980: 135).
5. These questions are taken from Totten et al. (1997:
xxv) substituting ‘famine’ for ‘genocide’.
6. The author is indebted to Haris Gazdar for drawing
my attention to this point in discussion. In another
context, that of international terrorism after
September 11th, I have argued against
criminalisation for precisely these reasons (Edkins
2002).
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